We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. If collusion breaks down, the holding company may relocate its two local units. It turns out that collusion with maximum prices is more profitable and more stable if price setting is delegated to the local units.
Introduction
Antitrust and competition authorities have to evaluate the implications of a merger for post-merger competition. To prevent coordinated effects in an industry, authorities have two types of remedies at their disposal: structural and non-structural (behavioral) remedies. The former are often associated with (partial) divestiture of assets owned by the acquiring firm. However, they may also involve a so-called spin-off where the shares of an acquired company are transferred to the stockholders of the acquiring firm and where the acquired firm is maintained as a separate entity.
1 Non-structural remedies may involve the delegation of decision-making powers. For instance, as Campbell and Halladay (2002) report, authorities in Canada accepted the "maintenance of the acquired firm as a separate and distinct corporate entity with a separate board of directors" (p. 10) in some cases 2 as a remedy to prevent anti-competitive behavior. In this paper we are interested in the implications for collusion when keeping (acquired) firms as separate entities with certain decision-making powers. At first sight, the above logic seems compelling: Giving decision-making powers away tends to have a similar effect like an increase in the number of firms in the market which makes it harder to sustain collusive behavior. However, this standard reasoning ignores the effect the delegation of decision powers has on the other firms in the market to collude. We show that while it turns out to be true that from the point of view of the holding company, its incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement are increased if it delegates decision powers to local units, the other firms in the market are less likely to deviate if decisions are made locally. In our model the latter effect dominates. We use a three-firm spatial modelà la Salop (1979) . In order to account for different decision-making structures, there is a holding company which owns two of the firms. The holding company decides whether to delegate the collusive price setting to its local units or not. Moreover, if collusion breaks down, the holding company decides about the relocation of its local units. We show that under full competition, the holding company prefers to keep the pricing decision by itself (Proposition 1 ).
when the holding company keeps authority). This implies stronger competition and thus lower prices and lower profits. So if discount rates are low and collusion with maximum prices is not possible (although a weaker form of collusion is still possible, see the third section), the holding company prefers to keep all decision-making powers. If, however, the discount rate is sufficiently high and collusion at maximum prices is possible, the picture changes: We assume that the colluding parties bargain over the collusive prices as in Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005) . Then, although the outside option (which is the competitive outcome) is better for the holding company if it keeps decision powers, the overall outcome is better for the holding company if the local units negotiate (Proposition 2 ). Intuitively, this can be understood by noting that in the latter case, the 'collusion cake' has to be shared by three players, two of which belong to the holding company. In the former case, there are two players trying to get their share of the cake.
4 When it comes to deviation, the holding company charges a higher deviating price compared to the case where local units set prices themselves and deviate (Proposition 3 ). This is due to the fact that a deviating firm has to find an optimal balance between a reduced price and an increased market share. A holding company only faces a single competitor which means that a larger market share can be achieved with a less severe price cut. These results have consequences for the stability of collusion at maximum prices. It is well known from the literature that collusion becomes less stable if there are more parties to it. So one would expect that also here collusion will break down more easily if the pricing is delegated to the local units as then three parties are involved in the collusion. In line with intuition, Lemma 1 shows that the critical discount rate, i.e. the discount rate where a party is just indifferent between colluding and deviating, is smaller for the holding company for the case where it keeps decision powers compared to the case where it delegates the pricing decision. However, for the outside firm in the market, the opposite holds. Lemma 2 shows that the outside firm has a smaller critical discount rate if the holding company delegates the pricing decision to its local units. Under the partially centralized decisionmaking regime, a more severe punishment due to an increased competition among the outside firm and the local units outweighs the decrease in collusive profit. Putting both results together, Proposition 4 shows that indeed maximum prices in the market are more likely to be sustained if the holding company delegates decision-making powers. Finally, in Proposition 5 the results are summarized. Here we also discuss the case for intermediate and low discount rates where, as shown by Chang (1991) , collusion does not break down completely but is still possible at lower collusive prices. There has been a growing interest in understanding the effects that different internal firm structures have on market outcomes. However, the literature focuses mainly on strategic implications of divisionalization for competition and the resulting profits as well as on relative profits of insiders and outsiders in the context of mergers. What has been neglected in the contributions so far is an analysis of the implications of different decision-making regimes on the profitability and stability of collusive agreements. Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996) assume divisionalization by one firm which increases the number of quantity-setting firms producing the same output in the industry. This drives down industry profit but the multidivisional firm enjoys a greater share of these profits. The authors show that the second effect is stronger which means that divisionalization is profitable. Huck, Konrad, and Müller (2004) develop a model where a joint headquarter lets two divisions decide on output quantities. Additionally, it sets up an internal sequential game in which the divisions compete against one another and where there are internal information flows due to the sequential nature of the game.
5 This implies that the market resembles a Stackelberg rather than a Cournot market. As a result, mergers may be profitable and welfare-improving even if the linear cost function is the same for all firms. At the same time, competitors are worse off as their profits decrease. In a similar setup, Creane and Davidson (2004) come to the same conclusion. The papers by Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) and Spagnolo (2005) are related to the present one with respect to the delegation of decision powers and its implications for collusion. Contrary to these contributions, we do not compare the effects of different (publicly observable) contract schemes for the stability of collusion but consider different decision-making scenarios. Relatedly, Olaizola (2007) studies the effects of strategic delegation on endogenous cartel formation among symmetric firms. In her model of Cournot competition, managers maximize a linear combination of profits and sales revenues. This results in a higher quantity per firm and lower profits where both cartel members and outside (independent) firms produce the same quantity. As a consequence the reduction in profits due to strategic delegation is less severe for cartel members as losses are shared while this 5 The authors show that this sequential structure also arises endogenously when the divisions may make their own timing decisions.
is not true for independent firms. Hence, the free-riding incentive decreases and the incentive to form cartels increases.
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The paper proceeds as follows. We first set up the model and look at the competitive case. Next we analyze collusion and derive the critical discount factors. We then compare the outcomes and the profitability for the two decision-making regimes. The last section concludes.
The model
We want to capture the trade-off a holding company faces when having to decide about delegating decision-making powers under market collusion. To this end, we follow the well known Salop (1979) setup for a market of spatial competition with horizontal product differentiation. There are three firms with two firms (firms 2 and 3) being governed by a holding company. All three firms are initially located equidistantly from each other along a circular city with a circumference of 1. A holding company faces two decisions: pricing and relocation. As we are interested in the implications of the holding company's internal structure for collusion, we consider two cases: (i) The holding company has all decision-making powers, i.e. it decides on relocation and sets prices for both local units. (ii) The holding company delegates some of its decision-making powers: It decides on relocation only whereas prices are set by the local firms individually.
8 See Figure 1 for an illustration. We model collusive behavior following Friedman (1971) : Firms tacitly agree to collude. So, in every period the holding company and the third firm set collusive prices whenever no one deviated from the agreement in the previous period. If there is deviation, this triggers a price war. The holding company may decide about the relocation of its two local units and there is competition forever. A problem with the modeling by Friedman (1971) and with most models on collusive outcomes is that there are many prices which can be sustained in equilibrium.
9 Usually the literature concentrates on those prices which maximize the overall collusive profit. This procedure 6 A critical assumption is that firms outside the cartel gain higher profits. 7 When it comes to the internal decision-making structure actually preferred by the merging firms, Prechel, Boies, and Woods (1999) show in an empirical study that these firms tend to opt for decentralized decision making.
8 Note that one may also think of a situation where the pricing decision is partially delegated only. This could be done by having local units take into account the other unit's (weighted) profits as well.
9 This is true independent of the value of the discount factor. See below the discussion of the δ-adjusted collusive prices. might be considered reasonable as long as firms are symmetric. Here, however, the outside firm and the holding company differ. Therefore, we follow Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005) and assume that at an initial stage, the price-setting parties bargain over the collusive prices. As is common for the analysis of collusion, we will later make use of the so-called critical discount factors in order to set the range of discount factors for which maximum collusive prices are sustainable. Critical discount factors according to Friedman (1971) are defined as follows:
where no superscript as well as superscripts c and d denote profits in the competitive, collusive, and deviating cases, respectively. Hence, in the following we will derive the profits for all three situations. We start with the punishment case as the profits under price competition will be needed to derive the optimal collusive prices.
Punishment: competition in prices and relocation
This part of the analysis is similar to Posada and Straume (2004) . While they use a more general model with a transportation-cost function that incorporates a linear as well as a quadratic component, we only consider the 10 The critical discount factor can be derived from the requirement that profits from the collusive agreement must be higher than those from deviation and the ensuing punishment phase, i.e.
case of linear transportation costs.
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We start by defining customer utility. Suppose that customers derive a basic utility of 1 from consuming the product offered by firm i. Furthermore, a customer has to incur (linear) transportation costs of 1 per unit of distance when traveling to some firm i. p i denotes the price charged by firm i. Hence, a customer located at some distance Δ i from firm i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) derives the following net utility u i when buying from this firm:
In the competitive case, the holding company may want to relocate its two local units. To do so, it has to incur a quadratic, fixed per-period cost k per unit of distance. 12 We assume k ∈ [1, 2] in order to obtain an interior solution and to simplify computations.
Fully centralized decision making
We start by considering the case where the holding company makes all decisions (superscript f ). Denote by x f i the position of the marginal customer located in between firm i and the next firm in the clockwise direction and by ϑ f the level of relocation towards the outside firm (i.e. ϑ f > 0). Then, the indifferent customer between firm 1 (price p f 1 ) and 2 (price p f h where subscript h stands for the holding company) can be obtained as follows:
Hence, from the profits for firm 1 and the holding company, we can derive the optimal prices depending only on the degree of relocation in the usual way. These prices yield a profit for the holding company of
The maximization problem for the holding company with respect to ϑ f yields:
11 See their section 2.1.1. Moreover, they also consider the case where the holding company coordinates the joint setting of prices but where its two local firms make individual choices concerning relocation.
12 One may interpret the additional fixed costs as investments into the quality of the product, a license fee, etc. which are due every period. This assumption is made in order to keep the solution to the Nash bargaining problem tractable by ensuring that the profit is the same for all punishment periods.
Given our assumption concerning k, the above expression is always positive which means that the holding company will relocate its two units towards firm 1. Given the optimal level of relocation, prices and profits amount to
and
Note that given the degree of relocation and the prices, the basic utility is large enough so that every customer between two firms has indeed an incentive to join one of these firms, i.e. the market is covered.
We now turn to the case where the holding company gives away some of its decision-making powers.
Partially centralized decision making
Partially centralized decision making is characterized by a situation where the holding company only decides about the degree of relocation and where its local units are in charge of price setting (superscript p). As a result, the punishment involves price competition between all three firms. Like Posada and Straume (2004), we assume that the managers of the local units maximize the profits of their individual unit.
Proceeding in the same way as before gives 13 Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) and Spagnolo (2005) analyze managers' incentives to collude depending on the form of their wage contract which is assumed observable.
Once more, the above expression is always positive, i.e. there is relocation towards firm 1. Thus, prices and profits amount to
The profit of a local unit net of the costs for relocation is given by
where l ∈ {2, 3}. 14 Note that the market is covered here as well.
The findings of this section, which are due to Posada and Straume (2004) and which are adapted to serve our purpose, are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For the punishment case, a comparison of the two decisionmaking regimes leads to
14 If, instead, local units had to pay for relocation (which is the case in the setup by Posada and Straume (2004) ), they would make a profit of π p l = 50k 18(25k−1) . However, in this situation, the result with respect to the comparison of the discount factors would qualitatively be the same (see below).
Obvious from equations (9) and (15). Ad (v): Obvious from equations (5) and (11).
Result (ii) states that under competition the holding company will set higher prices. By setting prices itself, the holding company can avoid competing with itself for the customers located in between its two local units. As prices are strategic complements it follows immediately that firm 1 will charge a higher price if the holding company sets the prices for its units. Hence, result (i). Results (iii) and (iv) translate the higher prices into higher profits. The decision to relocate (result (v)) can be understood by noting that if the holding company delegates price-setting power to the local units, it anticipates stronger competition and thus would like to reduce the competitive pressure by not moving them too close to firm 1.
We now proceed with analyzing the different scenarios under collusion.
Collusive outcome
In this section it is assumed that collusion is feasible. The incentives to defect from collusion are analyzed in the next section. Again, we have to distinguish between the two cases of internal decision making.
Fully centralized decision making
We start with the situation where all decisions are made by the holding company.
15 Like Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005) , we assume that under collusion prices will be set according to the Nash bargaining solution 16 , i.e. the maximization problem is as follows: 
. In the appendix we provide a formal proof for the derivation of the optimal collusive prices. It is shown that the holding company will set its collusive price at the highest possible level and that the market is always covered. This means that the customer halfway between the holding company's local units will be left with zero utility, i.e. p . At the same time, the outside firm charges a lower collusive price.
Partially centralized decision making
Next, we are interested in the collusive prices if the holding company does not set the prices for its two local units. Again, prices will be set according to the Nash bargaining solution:
where profits are calculated as π for l, m ∈ {2, 3} and l = m. Note that in order to keep computations tractable, we assume that collusion is only feasible if all three firms located around the circular city participate, i.e. there is a grand coalition. The optimal collusive price for all three firms turns out to be set at the maximum level:
Profits thus amount to 
We summarize our findings from this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Comparing both decision-making regimes under collusion yields: and share the market equally (result (ii)). If, however, the holding company keeps authority over prices, then it will be worse off. While its units still charge (result (ii)), firm 1 charges a lower price (result (i)), leaving less profit to the holding company. This result is not straightforward as there are two forces which work in different directions: Proposition 1 showed that in the case of breakdown of collusion, a holding company fares better by keeping decision powers. This effect of a more favorable outside option leads to an increase in bargaining power which tends to lead to a higher collusive profit. On the other hand, as the parties bargain over the collusive prices, the holding company fares worse in bilateral negotiations. This is intuitively clear as by direct negotiations, the 'collusive cake', i.e. the profits generated by collusion, has to be divided among two players. If, however, the two local units negotiate for themselves, this cake is divided among three firms two of which are owned by the holding company. More formally, in equilibrium the profits of the holding company's local units enter the maximization problem additively in the former case (see (17)) while in the latter case, they enter quadratically (see (18)). A marginal increase in profits increases this expression more if profits enter quadratically.
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Having determined the collusive prices, we next turn to the deviation incentives firms have.
One-period deviation incentives
We start with the simpler case where the outside firm deviates from the collusive agreement. As the prices charged by the holding company's two 18 As such, the result that the larger (merged) firm does relatively worse than the outside firm resembles the merger paradox under quantity competition without the possibility of relocation. One may argue that such a distribution of profits in the present scenario is due to the fact that all parties have the same bargaining power. Indeed, giving the holding company (sufficiently) more bargaining power when 'negotiating' with the outside firm would result in equal profits for all three (local) firms. However, we think that our specification is suitable insofar as factors that usually lead to the different degrees of bargaining power like impatience, risk of breakdown, (legally binding) commitment tactics, etc. (see Muthoo (1999) ) are not relevant here.
local units are the same under both decision regimes, the one-period deviation incentives by firm 1 are the same for both internal decision-making rules. Determining firm 1's deviation profit in the usual way, differentiating with respect to p d 1 , and solving for the optimal price for firm 1 when deviating yields
Profit for the deviating firm hence amounts to
We now look at the deviation incentives of the holding company and the two local units, respectively. When it comes to the deviation incentives, the internal decision-making processes will indeed play an important role. This is due to the fact that the delegation of decisions will determine the potentially deviating entity: the holding company (under fully centralized decision making) or one of the local firms (under partially centralized decision making). Starting with the second case, the analysis goes along the same lines as for the case where firm 1 deviates as all three firms charge the same collusive price.
the deviating price set by one of the local units under partially centralized decision making. Performing the same analysis under fully centralized decision making leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 One-period deviation incentives imply that
If the holding company keeps pricing power and deviates, it will charge a higher price compared to the case where local units set prices themselves and deviate. At first glance this may not seem obvious as the collusive price by firm 1 is lower in the case without the delegation of decision-making powers, so one would expect the best reply to that price to be a lower price too. Whenever a firm deviates, however, it has to find an optimal balance between a reduction in price and an increase in market share. Therefore, when deviating, a single local unit facing two competitors will lower its price to a larger extent as the increase in market share outweighs the decrease in prices. A holding company, on the other hand, only faces the outside firm which means that a larger market share can be achieved with a comparatively less severe price reduction.
Given the results from the analysis so far, it is now possible to calculate the critical discount factors in order to compare the profitability of collusive agreements under different decision-making rules.
Sustainability of maximum prices under collusion
In order to analyze the overall incentives to deviate from the maximum collusive prices, discount factors as mentioned above are calculated. They define the range for which the maximum collusive prices can be sustained: The higher the discount factor, the smaller this range. First, we analyze how the internal decision-making process affects the deviation incentives for the holding company and its two local units. Letδ
. We obtain:
Proof See the appendix. On the holding-company level, collusion is more stable under a fully centralized decision-making structure. Giving away decision-making powers to the local units will make deviation from the collusive agreement more likely when considering maximum collusive prices. The reason for this is similar to the classic argument of why collusion becomes less stable if there are more parties to it.
19 Deviating is much more attractive for a local unit as it also steals customers from the other local unit and not just from firm 1. In addition, firm 1 charges a higher price for the case where pricing power is with the local units which makes deviation even more profitable. So although future punishment is harder, i.e. the profits in future periods are lower if pricing rests with the local units, the first two effects outweigh the latter to give the result of Lemma 1. Next, we look at the outside firm. Letδ
. Then, we can state the following result:
Proof A formal proof for this comparison of the discount factors goes along the same lines as the one for Lemma 1 and is therefore omitted.
The result from Lemma 1 is turned around as the outside firm is more likely to deviate if the holding company does not delegate any of its decisionmaking powers. There are two effects which affect the stability of collusion with maximum prices in opposite ways: On the one hand, collusion with a holding company is more profitable for firm 1 which makes collusion more stable. At the same time, however, the punishment for deviating is less severe making deviation a more attractive option. Lemma 2 gives an answer to the question of how to weigh these opposite effects against each other: Under the partially centralized decision-making regime, the prospect of a more severe punishment due to an increased competition among the outside firm and the local units is of greater importance compared to the decrease in collusive profit. From a market point of view, we have to find the weakest link for the collusion with maximum prices, i.e. the firm with the largest critical discount rate, to determine whether collusion is stable or not. This is given in the next proposition: Given maximum collusive prices, Proposition 4 shows that if the holding company has all decision-making powers, the outside firm is more likely to deviate from the collusive agreement. If local units decide on prices, they are more likely to deviate. The critical discount factor of firm 1 under the fully centralized decision-making regime is larger than the critical discount factor of the local units under the delegation scenario. Hence, maximum collusive prices can be sustained for a broader range of discount factors when the holding company gives away some of its decision-making powers. This is not necessarily what one expects as usually a lower number of firms in the market means that collusion can be sustained more easily. Here, however, the less severe punishment under fully centralized decision making turns this result around.
Proposition 4 For the case where the holding company has all decisionmaking powers, it holds thatδ
As shown in Chang (1991), a lower discount factor than the critical one does not necessarily mean that collusion is not sustainable in a situation where firms are horizontally differentiated. Firms may not be able to charge their maximum collusive prices but prices higher than the competitive prices can still be supported as a collusive outcome as long as the discount factor is strictly positive. Hence, one arrives at a δ-adjusted collusive price which is strictly decreasing in the discount factor. If the discount factor converges to 0, then the price converges to the competitive price. We will not derive the explicit collusive prices for this scenario as computations are not tractable. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to understand the mechanism just described. Hence, the profitability of collusion depends on the degree of centralization of decision-making powers. Whereas the centralization of these powers makes sense for lower discount factors, intermediate and high discount factors suggest the decentralization of internal decision responsibilities.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze how different internal decision-making structures affect the stability of collusive agreements. Our findings can be summarized as follows. Making use of a three-firm spatial modelà la Salop (1979) , we find that on the holding-company level, (i) the maximum profit from collusion is higher if the holding company delegates some of its authority and (ii) if it does so, however, the incentives for its local units to deviate from the collusive agreement are increased. From the perspective of the market as a whole, however, we find that (iii) the critical discount factor is determined by the outside firm: It becomes smaller if decision making is delegated to the local units. Therefore, antitrust and competition authorities should be careful when imposing certain restrictions with respect to the decision-making structure on merging firms. While the "maintenance of the acquired firm as a separate and distinct corporate entity with a separate board of directors" (see the introduction) might restrain the merged firm in some of its detrimental economic behavior, it might, however, enable the market as a whole to collude.
derivation of implicit expressions for the prices (first-order conditions), and (iii) iterated elimination with respect to the lower bounds and the implicit expressions. 
. Prices that are lower than these boundaries are not incentive compatible. As these boundary prices are dependent on the other price, we look at the comparison of profits in both scenarios once again. Plugging the implicit expression for p to the maximization problem. It also turns out to be the only solution as proceeding in the same way withp : We can now derive the optimal collusive prices. As we have imposed the restriction that the market must be covered, this translates into a restriction that the holding company's local units must charge a price equal to or lower than 5 6
. Also, firm 1 will never charge a price larger than 1 as this would imply that no customer could derive positive utility from buying the product. This, however, implies that the reaction functions do not necessarily yield the optimal price levels when inserted into each other-the levels may actually lie beyond these upper bounds. Therefore, we apply an iterated elimination of implausible prices. To this end, we plug the explicit lower bound for the price charged by firm 1 into the reaction function for the holding company's price. It can be shown thatp h ∀k ∈ [1, 2] holds, i.e. the resulting price is higher than the initial minimum price level. This means we have a new lower boundary for the price charged by the holding company. As we have mentioned before, both prices increase with an increase in the other price. This means that due to the increase inp 1,1 will increase as well which in turn will trigger another increase inp f,c h,1 and so on. This implies that exactly one of the two prices will be set at its highest possible value. 23 To decide which one it should be, we find the following inequality:p which means that it is never optimal to set a higher price for firm 1 than for the holding company whenever one of the prices exceeds .
Partial market coverage
When it comes to partial market coverage, there are three cases which are relevant: (i) no full coverage between any two firms, (ii) no coverage between the outside firm and the local units, and (iii) no coverage between the local units. Note that in order to have only partial market coverage in cases (i) and (ii), the lower price must satisfy the following condition: 1 −p − 1 3 ≤ 0 ⇔ 23 Note that the local units belonging to the holding company can never set a price above 5 6 as this would violate the assumption that the market has to be covered.
i.e. 1 − p
